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In November 2007, seven years after its launch, Geneva Call released a comprehensive review of the work it has carried out with its part-ners to advocate the mine ban among non-state actors. The review, 
Engaging Armed Non-State Actors in a Landmine Ban: The Geneva Call 
Progress Report (2000–2007),3 which is largely based on the findings of 
an internal assessment4 and research efforts conducted by Geneva Call,5 
documents the progress accomplished to date and the challenges that 
lie ahead. In an effort to further enhance the effectiveness of engaging 
NSAs in the future, it also provides practical recommendations. 
Progress to Date
The report notes that, by its publication, 34 NSAs from Burma/
Myanmar, Burundi, India, Iraq, the Philippines, Somalia, Sudan, 
Turkey and Western Sahara had signed the Deed of Commitment.6 This 
achievement is noteworthy because many of these groups were previ-
ously involved in the use and production of anti-personnel mines; addi-
tionally, as a result of Geneva Call and its partners’ efforts, eight other 
NSAs have pledged to prohibit or limit the use of AP mines, either uni-
laterally or through a ceasefire agreement with the government.
Since 2000, signatory NSAs have, for the most part, complied with 
their obligations under the Deed of Commitment by refraining from 
using AP mines, cooperating in mine action with specialized organi-
zations and, for some of them, destroying their stockpiles. Nearly all 
signatories have cooperated with Geneva Call’s monitoring of their 
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Geneva Call has been engaging armed non-state 
actors in a landmine ban since 2000. The Swiss-
based nongovernmental organization was created in 
response to the realization that the landmine problem 
could only be comprehensively addressed if NSAs, 
who are the primary users of such weapons today, 
were included in the solution. To this end, Geneva 
Call has developed an innovative mechanism—the 
Deed of Commitment for Adherence to a Total Ban 
on Anti-Personnel Mines and for Cooperation in Mine 
Action1—that enables NSAs, who cannot accede to 
the Ottawa Convention,2 to undertake to respect 
its norms.
Destruction of more than 3,300 stockpiled anti-personnel mines by the Polisario Front, 
in compliance with the Deed of Commitment, Western Sahara, 2007.
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compliance by providing information on the measures they have taken 
to implement the Deed of Commitment and facilitating field verifica-
tion missions.
In some countries, the signing of the Deed of Commitment precipi-
tated the launch of much-needed mine-action programs by specialized 
organizations in areas under the control of signatory NSAs. Such prog-
ress has occurred, for example, in southern Sudan and Western Sahara, 
where international involvement in humanitarian mine action was lim-
ited, if not nonexistent, before the signing.
Signatory NSAs have been instrumental in the accession to and 
implementation of the Ottawa Convention by their respective states. In 
Sudan, the signing of the Deed of Commitment by the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Movement/Army in 2001 was a key consideration in the 
government’s decision to ratify the Ottawa Convention two years lat-
er.7 In Iraq, officials of the Kurdish NSAs who became members of the 
national government after the fall of Saddam Hussein regime in 2003 
encouraged the government to join the Convention. Iraq acceded to the 
Ottawa Convention in 2007, as one of the very few states in the region 
to have done so.
Geneva Call’s initiative has received increased support from the 
international community. States Parties to the Ottawa Convention, the 
United Nations, intergovernmental bodies such as the European Union 
and the African Union, the International Committee of the Red Cross, 
and the International Campaign to Ban Landmines have repeatedly 
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acknowledged that progress towards a mine-
f ree world wou ld be enhanced i f NSAs 
observed the Ottawa Convention’s provisions 
and have supported efforts to engage NSAs.
Challenges
Although much progress has been made, 
engaging NSAs in a mine ban has not been 
without its challenges. Many NSAs still have 
not agreed to the Deed of Commitment and 
continue to resort to AP mines and/or victim- 
act ivated improvised explosive dev ices. 
Among them are major users and producers 
such as Colombian guerrillas and Burmese 
opposition groups, which are reluctant to 
renounce these weapons; moreover, several 
NSAs retain large stocks of AP mines in terri-
tories under their control.
Progress in the implementation of the 
Deed of Commitment has been slowed by 
the lack of technical assistance and resources 
available to signatory NSAs and Geneva Call. 
A number of signatories have been unable, for 
example, to undertake mine action on their 
own—particularly mine clearance, stockpile 
destruction and victim assistance—due to 
their limited technical knowledge and lack of 
qualified manpower, equipment and funding. 
A lack of funding has also affected the capac-
ity of Geneva Call and its technical partners 
to support mine action in areas under the 
control of signatory groups. 
A related challenge has been to ensure 
that al l signatories fully comply with the 
Deed of Commitment. Some groups have 
experienced dif f icult ies in gett ing their 
rank and file to adhere to all obligations. A 
few others have not yet provided details on 
their AP mine stocks nor proceeded with the 
destruction of such mines.
In some countr ies , Geneva Ca l l has 
encountered problems in accessing NSAs 
operating in remote areas. In other cases, 
sa fety concerns and f ight ing have ham-
pered the implementat ion and monitor-
ing of the Deed of Commitment. In Somalia 
for instance, a volatile security situation and 
renewed clashes in 2006 prevented Geneva 
Call and its technical partners from inspect-
ing mine stocks held by signatory factions and 
arranging for their destruction.
Although most states concerned with 
NSAs have cooperated with Geneva Call, a 
small number of them have made the work 
challenging. Turkey has consistently opposed 
engagement with the Kurdistan Workers’ 
Party, a group it considers a “terrorist” orga-
nization, arguing that this would confer it 
legitimacy. Though not objecting to the prin-
ciple of NSA engagement, a few other states 
have restricted Geneva Call’s access to areas 
where NSAs operate or have obstructed mine-
action efforts by specialized organizations.
Results
Since the launch of Geneva Call in 2000, 
significant progress has been made in engag-
ing NSAs in the landmine ban. Thirty-five 
armed groups have now signed the Deed of 
Commitment and, for the most part, have 
abided by its terms; moreover, in some coun-
tries, their commitment has facilitated the 
launch of new mine-action programs by spe-
cialized organizations as well as the accession 
to the Ottawa Convention by their respec-
tive states. Many chal lenges remain, but 
Geneva Call’s Progress Report illustrates how 
NSA engagement work can be effective in 
securing their compliance with the Ottawa 
Convention’s provisions. 
See Endnotes, page 113
T he repor t can be downloaded f rom 
Geneva Call’s Web site: www.genevacall.org. 
Hard copies can be obtained by writing to 
info@genevacall.org.
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Mongooses, Robots Team up for Demining
A team of Sri Lankan researchers has been testing a new system for clearing minefields. This 
system involves the use of trained mongooses, which possess a heightened sense of smell, to 
detect buried explosives. 
The mongooses are tethered to remote-controlled robots, which carry small video cameras that 
detect the precise location of a buried explosive. Researchers say the system is particularly 
beneficial because the combined weight of each pair is insufficient to trigger a landmine. 
In one test, according to reports, the robot-mongoose team took just 30 seconds to locate a 
buried landmine a few feet away from where it started.
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